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2769 
THE FAIL-SAFE CLASS AS AN INDEPENDENT 
BAR TO CLASS CERTIFICATION 
Erin L. Geller* 
 
In 2012, the Fifth Circuit became the first circuit court to explicitly reject 
an argument that a fail-safe class—a class defined in terms of the 
defendant’s liability—was barred from class certification under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  Drawing on previous cases in which it had 
rejected challenges that class definitions were circular, the Fifth Circuit in 
In re Rodriguez outright disclaimed a prohibition against fail-safe classes.  
This decision diverged from the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ proscription 
against certifying fail-safe classes, creating a split among the circuits. 
This Note explores this circuit split and argues that fail-safe classes must 
be proscribed because they allow class members to escape the bar of res 
judicata.  This Note concludes that characterizing a class as fail-safe 
should provide independent justification for denying class certification.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“All individuals wrongfully denied Z by XY Corporation.”  This class 
definition creates the paradigmatic fail-safe class, where the defendant’s 
liability must be established before class membership can be ascertained.1  
If XY Corporation wrongfully denied individuals Z, the individuals are class 
members bound by the favorable judgment against XY Corporation.2  
However, if XY Corporation did not wrongfully deny individuals Z, then the 
 
 1. See Kamar v. RadioShack Corp., 375 F. App’x 734, 736 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The fail-
safe appellation is simply a way of labeling the obvious problems that exist when the class 
itself is defined in a way that precludes membership unless the liability of the defendant is 
established.”); see also John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Jordan M. Schwartz, Courts 
Search for Class Certification “Fail Safe” Factor, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 4, 2011, at 12. 
 2. See Dafforn v. Rousseau Assocs., Inc., No. F 75-74, 1976 WL 1358, at *1 (N.D. Ind. 
July 27, 1976). 
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individuals are defined out of the class and are not bound by the judgment.3  
A fail-safe class thus creates a “heads I win, tails you lose” situation, where 
class members either receive a favorable judgment or are defined out of the 
class.4 
Defendants contend that fail-safe classes categorically cannot be 
certified.5  The Sixth and Seventh Circuits agree with this argument and 
have held that fail-safe classes are precluded from class certification.6  
However, the Fifth Circuit recently rejected a prohibition against certifying 
fail-safe classes by relying on prior Fifth Circuit cases that had addressed 
circular class definitions.7  Further, while the Ninth Circuit has not 
explicitly prohibited fail-safe classes, it has applied Fifth Circuit case law to 
reject a challenge that the originally certified class definition was circular.8  
This Note examines the conflicting analyses these courts have used in 
determining whether a fail-safe class is barred from class certification.9 
Part I introduces the class action device and the motion for class 
certification, describes the ascertainability requirement, and casts the issue 
of whether courts must bar fail-safe classes from class certification as an 
ascertainability problem.  Part II examines the split among the circuits over 
whether a fail-safe class can be certified.  Part III argues that fail-safe 
classes must be proscribed because certifying a fail-safe class violates res 
judicata, a consideration that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have failed to 
address.  Finally, this Note concludes that fail-safe classes independently 
bar class certification due to their failure to satisfy the ascertainability 
requirement. 
I.  THE FAIL-SAFE CLASS AS AN ASCERTAINABILITY PROBLEM 
Part I.A presents the class action as a form of representative litigation and 
provides an overview of the motion for class certification.  Next, Part I.B 
explains the ascertainability requirement for class certification and the 
origins of the requirement.  Part I.C describes fail-safe classes as one 
 
 3. See Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 4. Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra note 1; Drew Campbell, Heads I Win, Tails You 
Lose:  Fail-Safe Class Definitions, BRICKER (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.bricker.com/
publications-and-resources/publications-and-resources-details.aspx?Publicationid=2248. 
 5. See, e.g., Dafforn, 1976 WL 1358, at *1 (agreeing with the defendants’ challenge 
that the amended class definition was fail-safe).  
 6. See, e.g., Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Messner, 669 F.3d at 825; Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352 (6th 
Cir. 2011); Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 7. See In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2012); Mullen v. Treasure Chest 
Casino, 186 F.3d 620, 624 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999); Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 
1105 (5th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541 (2011); Wystan M. Ackerman, Rule 23(b)(2) and Fail-Safe Classes Addressed by 
Fifth Circuit, INS. CLASS ACTIONS INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.insurance
classactions.com/class-certification-standards/rule-23b2-and-fail-safe-classes-addressed-by-
fifth-circuit/. 
 8. See Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Wash., 173 F.3d 713, 722 (9th Cir. 
1999), amended, 184 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
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category of classes failing to satisfy the ascertainability requirement and 
explains that courts have prohibited fail-safe classes because fail-safe 
classes circumvent the bar of res judicata and prevent class members from 
notice and the opportunity to opt out of the action. 
A.  Class Certification 
This section introduces the purposes of the class action device and details 
the procedural requirements for class certification under Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.10 
1.  Class Actions As Representative Litigation 
Class actions are a form of representative litigation in which one or more 
named class representatives litigate on behalf of a defined group of 
similarly situated persons, referred to as absent class members.11  If a court 
certifies the proposed class, the absent class members will be bound by a 
judgment as long as they were adequately represented by the class 
representatives.12  The absent class members are not required to hire an 
attorney or appear before the court and play a passive role in the class 
litigation.13  To ensure that the interests of absent class members are 
represented, the class representative and class counsel have a duty to fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of the absent class members.14   
Class actions provide an opportunity for individuals with small monetary 
claims to pursue litigation collectively and bring claims that they could not 
otherwise afford to litigate.15  Also, by enabling litigation that could not 
 
 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  Many states have mirrored their procedural requirements off of 
Rule 23 and similarly require that a class be adequately defined at the class certification 
stage. See THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CLASS ACTIONS:  THE LAW OF 50 STATES § 6.02 (2012).  
While this Note focuses on federal cases that address the fail-safe issue, many states have 
also dealt with fail-safe classes under state law. See, e.g., LaBerenz v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 181 P.3d 328, 335–36 (Colo. App. 2007) (recognizing that fail-safe classes were 
impermissible but finding that the proposed class was not fail-safe); Dale v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., 204 S.W.3d 151, 178–80 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that generally a fail-safe class 
was not ascertainable but that the proposed class was not fail-safe as there would still be 
class members if there was a judgment for the defendant); Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 
22 S.W.3d 398, 402–05 (Tex. 2000) (finding that the trial court abused its discretion by 
certifying a fail-safe class including natural gas producers that sold natural gas to the 
defendant in quantities less than their ratable proportions); Russell T. Brown, Comment, 
Class Dismissed:  The Conservative Class Action Revolution of the Texas Supreme Court, 
32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 449, 471–73 (2001). 
 11. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (“The class action is 
‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 
named parties only.’” (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979))). 
 12. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (g)(1)(B). 
 15. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“‘The policy at the 
very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do 
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her 
rights.’” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997))); Phillips Petrol. 
Co., 472 U.S. at 809 (“Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which 
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otherwise be brought, class actions prevent defendants from avoiding 
liability and serve as a deterrent for future wrongdoing.16  By consolidating 
claims into a single adjudication that binds each class member, class actions 
also conserve judicial resources17 and promote consistency.18 
2.  The Motion for Class Certification 
Class certification is a crucial point in class action litigation.19  From the 
plaintiff’s perspective, the denial of class certification “may sound the 
‘death knell’” of the class action.20  From the defendant’s perspective, the 
granting of class certification may create pressure to settle nonmeritorious 
claims to avoid the costs of defending a class action and the risk of highly 
damaging liability.21 
Under Rule 23(c)(1)(A),22 the district court has broad discretion to 
determine whether to certify the class.23  If the court certifies the proposed 
class, the certification order must outline the scope of the class bound by 
judgment by defining the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses.24  
Following certification, a party may seek interlocutory review of the order 
 
would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”); Miriam Gilles, Class Dismissed:  
Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 305, 306–07 (2010) (arguing that the class action device facilitates small claims class 
actions). 
 16. See BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK 15 (2d ed. 
2012); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions:  Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and 
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 48–49 (1975) (explaining that one policy advanced 
for the expansion of class action litigation is the deterrence of wrongful conduct). 
 17. See Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 647 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that one 
of the primary purposes of class litigation was judicial economy by avoiding multiple suits); 
ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 16, at 14–15. 
 18. See Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 551, 559 (D. Md. 
2006) (finding that class litigation was an effective method of adjudicating the class 
members’ claims because it avoided inconsistent outcomes); ANDERSON & TRASK, supra 
note 16, at 15–16. 
 19. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (“Irrespective of the merits, certification decisions may have a decisive effect on 
litigation.”); Jason Steed, On “Ascertainability” As a Bar to Class Certification, 23 APP. 
ADVOC. 626, 626 (2011) (describing class certification as the “make-or-break” moment for a 
class action). 
 20. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Newton, 259 F.3d at 162). 
 21. See id. 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).  Prior to the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, Rule 
23(c)(1)(A) directed courts to decide the class certification issue “as soon as practicable.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (2003 amendment).  The 2003 amendment now 
directs the courts to decide whether to certify the class at “an early practicable time,” giving 
courts greater flexibility in timing the class certification decision. Id. 
 23. See Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1331–32 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Cook v. 
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 151 F.R.D. 378, 380 (D. Colo. 1993); 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed. 
2005).   
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). 
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granting or denying class certification, although it is within the discretion of 
the appellate court to decide whether to permit the appeal.25 
To determine whether to certify the class, the court must conduct a 
“rigorous analysis”26 to decide whether the Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements 
are satisfied.27  A party seeking to certify a class must meet all four 
prerequisites under Rule 23(a) and fit into one of the categories under Rule 
23(b).28  To satisfy the Rule 23(a) prerequisites:  (1) the class must be so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (numerosity); 
(2) there must be questions of law or fact common to the class 
(commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the class must be typical of the 
claims or defense of the class (typicality); and (4) the representative parties 
must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class (adequacy of 
representation).29 
After satisfying the four prerequisites under Rule 23(a), the party seeking 
class certification must also fall under one of the categories of class actions 
maintainable under Rule 23(b).30  A class can be certified under Rule 
23(b)(1) if the prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of 
inconsistent judgments or would prejudice individual claimants.31  Rule 
23(b)(2) certification is appropriate for injunctive or declaratory relief if 
“the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that 
apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”32  And to 
certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must find that common 
questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only 
individual members (predominance) and that a class action is superior to 
other methods of fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy 
(superiority).33  Whether the predominance and superiority requirements are 
met under Rule 23(b)(3) depends on the class members’ interests in 
individually controlling the action, the extent and nature of litigation 
concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members, the 
desirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum, and the 
manageability difficulties.34 
If a court grants class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), it must notify the 
class members in the most practicable way under the circumstances—this 
includes providing individual notice to class members who can be identified 
 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).   
 26. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).  The Supreme Court 
recently held that Rule 23 sets forth more than a pleading standard and requires a party 
seeking class certification to “affirmatively demonstrate . . . compliance” with Rule 23. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 27. See 7AA WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, § 1785. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). 
 30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3).  
 31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D). 
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through reasonable effort.35  The named plaintiffs must also provide all 
class members in a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3) with an opportunity 
to opt out or exclude themselves from the class.36  If the court certifies the 
class under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2), it may direct notice to the class, 
as it deems appropriate; and class members may not opt out of the class.37 
B.  The Ascertainability Requirement 
This section defines the ascertainability requirement and details the 
purposes it serves in the motion for class certification.  It then examines the 
origins of the ascertainability requirement, showing that while some courts 
find it implicit in Rule 23(a), other courts find that the 2003 amendment to 
Rule 23(c)(1)(B) codified the ascertainability requirement.  Finally, it 
outlines three different categories of recent ascertainability jurisprudence. 
1.  The Requirement 
Class definitions are playing an increasingly decisive role in class 
certification decisions and are gaining more attention in legal scholarship.38  
Courts have recognized that class definitions are inadequate when the 
definition does not allow for an ascertainable class, finding it “axiomatic” 
that for a class action to be certified a class must exist.39  Moreover, several 
circuits have acknowledged that there is an ascertainability requirement for 
class certification.40  While no circuit has explicitly held that failing to 
 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950) (finding that the means employed to give notice must be the 
means that one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt). 
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15 (finding that 
notice must be reasonably calculated under the circumstances to afford interested parties the 
opportunity to present their objections to the action). 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A)–(B). 
 38. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 34–41), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038985; Steed, supra note 19, at 626; John H. Beisner, Jessica D. 
Miller & Jordan M. Schwartz, Ascertainability:  Reading Between the Lines of Rule 23, 12 
Class Action Litig. Rep. 253 (BNA) (Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.skadden.com/
sites/default/files/publications/Publications2371_0.pdf; Joel S. Feldman, Sarah Hughes 
Newman & Anna C. Schumaker, Ascertainability:  An Overlooked Requirement for Class 
Certification, 10 Class Action Litig. Rep. 607 (BNA) (June 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.sidley.com/files/Publication/b226a9d1-b7a6-4f79-8264-19695367ca62/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/04c766c6-5676-4f1e-9809-2037146a9ce0/BNA_
Feldman_Newman_Schumaker(2).pdf. 
 39. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981); see, e.g., Jermyn v. Best Buy 
Stores, L.P., 256 F.R.D. 418, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“‘Although Rule 23(a) does not 
expressly require that a class be definite in order to be certified, a requirement that there be 
an identifiable class has been implied by the courts.’” (quoting Fogarazzao v. Lehman Bros., 
Inc., 232 F.R.D. 176, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2005))). 
 40. See, e.g., Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012); 
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592–93 (3d Cir. 2012); Romberio v. 
UnumProvident Corp., 385 F. App’x 423, 431 (6th Cir. 2009); John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. 
Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 
30 (2d Cir. 2006); Simer, 661 F.2d at 669. 
 2776 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
satisfy the ascertainability requirement is independent grounds for denying 
class certification,41 district courts have denied class certification for 
exactly this reason.42  Commentators similarly feel that a class’s lack of 
ascertainability should be enough to justify denying certification.43  
Consequently, along with satisfying the Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements, 
the plaintiff must plead a sufficiently ascertainable class.44 
While some courts treat ascertainability as a threshold prerequisite prior 
to analyzing the Rule 23 requirements,45 others intertwine the two 
analyses.46  The ascertainability requirement can work congruously with the 
Rule 23 requirements47 because an ascertainable class can either 
demonstrate that the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied or expose problems 
with satisfying Rule 23(a) and (b).48 
The ascertainability requirement has been described in different ways, all 
of which are substantively indistinguishable.49  While some courts have 
described ascertainability as requiring that the class must be “precise, 
 
 41. Steed, supra note 19, at 628 (noting that while the circuits have relied on 
ascertainability to affirm the dismissal of class allegations, the circuits have not explicitly 
held that the lack of an ascertainable class is independent grounds for denying class 
certification).  However, the Fifth Circuit has held that if the absence of an ascertainable 
class is facially apparent from the pleadings, a district court may dismiss the class allegations 
on the pleadings. John, 501 F.3d at 445. 
 42. See, e.g., Jones-Turner v. Yellow Enter. Sys., LLC, No. 3:07CV-218-S, 2011 WL 
4861882, at *3–4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification 
of a state wage and hour class because the class was not ascertainable); Kissling v. Ohio Cas. 
Ins. Co., No. 5:10-22-JMH, 2010 WL 1978862, at *2–3 (E.D. Ky. May 14, 2010) 
(dismissing the class allegations because determining class membership would require 
“‘mini-hearings’” for each potential member of the class).  
 43. See 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:2 (4th ed. 
2007); Steed, supra note 19, at 629–30. 
 44. See Jermyn, 256 F.R.D. at 432 (recognizing that there is an implied ascertainability 
requirement for class certification); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 3:1 (5th ed. 2012) (explaining that the ascertainability requirement directs 
plaintiffs to propose a definite class). But see Blain v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 240 
F.R.D. 179, 184 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that the sufficiency of the class definition can be 
addressed under the Rule 23(a) analysis without having to engage in a “redundant exercise”). 
 45. See ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 16, at 25; see, e.g., Young v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537–41 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the defendant’s ascertainability 
arguments prior to addressing whether the class satisfied the Rule 23(a) and (b) 
requirements); Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing ascertainability as independent grounds for denying class certification before 
addressing predominance, the district court’s basis for decertifying the class). 
 46. See, e.g., Romberio v. UnumProvident Corp., 385 F. App’x 423, 431–32 (6th Cir. 
2009) (explaining that the problem with the class definition carried over into problems with 
typicality); Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513–15 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that the 
same analysis applied to both ascertainability and typicality). 
 47. Madeleine Fischer, Class Definition, in A PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 
47 (Marcy Hogan Greer ed., 2010). 
 48. Id. (“The class definition provides the measuring stick against which other 
requirements of Rule 23 are evaluated.”); Donald Frederico, Why Class Definitions Matter, 
PIERCE ATWOOD LLP (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.pierceatwood.com/35247. 
 49. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 44, § 3:3. 
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objective, and presently ascertainable,”50 other courts have found that a 
class is ascertainable where it is defined with reference to “objective 
criteria.”51  A few courts have also articulated that the ascertainability 
standard requires the class to be “adequately defined and clearly 
ascertainable.”52   
This third formulation of the ascertainability requirement demonstrates 
the interrelationship between an adequate class definition and 
ascertainability, showing that a class is not adequately defined if the class 
definition does not allow for an ascertainable class.53  Piecing together 
these different iterations of the ascertainability requirement, a class is not 
adequately defined if the class definition does not allow for an ascertainable 
class, and a class is not ascertainable if an identifiable class does not exist.54  
But “identifiable” does not mean that a court must be able to identify each 
member of the class before class certification.55  To establish 
ascertainability, a court only needs to be able to identify class members at 
some stage of the class action proceeding.56 
Courts and commentators have identified different purposes for the 
ascertainability requirement.  First, the ascertainability requirement alerts 
both the court and parties to the potential burdens of class certification.57  If 
the ascertainability requirement is not satisfied because individualized 
determinations are necessary to identify members of the class, failure to 
satisfy the ascertainability requirement indicates problems of administrative 
feasibility and manageability in class certification.58  Second, the 
ascertainability requirement ensures that the individuals bound by a 
judgment for or against the class can be identified.59  An ascertainable class 
also identifies which individuals are entitled to relief, ensuring that the 
individuals actually harmed by the defendant’s wrongful conduct are the 
 
 50. O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 319 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.14 (1995)). 
 51. Agostino v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 437, 478 (D.N.J. 2009); see also 
Fletcher v. ZLB Behring LLC, 245 F.R.D. 328, 335 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Intratex Gas Co. v. 
Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex. 2000). 
 52. DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970); Heffelfinger v. Elec. 
Data Sys. Corp., No. CV 07-00101 MMM (Ex), 2008 WL 8128621, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 
2008), aff’d, 492 F. App’x 710 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 53. See DeBremaecker, 433 F.2d at 734. 
 54. 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 43, § 4:2. 
 55. 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, § 1760.  
 56. See id. 
 57. See Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex. 2000).  While Intratex is a 
Texas case not governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the case provides a 
persuasive analysis of the fail-safe problem. See id.; supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Bledsoe v. Combs, No. NA 99-153-CH/G, 2000 WL 681094, at *4–5 (S.D. Ind. 
Mar. 14, 2000) (holding that it was not administratively feasible to determine which 
individuals were a member of the class because it would require individualized 
determinations on the merits of each person’s claim). 
 59. Eversole v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 05-124-KSF, 2007 WL 1558512, at *5 (E.D. 
Ky. May 29, 2007). 
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recipients of the awarded relief.60  Further, in a Rule 23(b)(3) action, an 
ascertainable class identifies the individuals who are entitled to notice, 
allowing those individuals the opportunity not to be bound by the 
judgment.61  Because of this right to opt out of the class, some courts find 
that the ascertainability inquiry requires more precision for Rule (23)(b)(3) 
suits than for Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) suits.62 
2.  Origins of the Requirement 
While ascertainability is widely considered a requirement for class 
certification,63 courts have cited different sources for its origin.  Prior to 
2003, when the rule was amended, courts found that the ascertainability 
requirement was implicit in Rule 23(a).64  Although this reading is still 
prevalent, some courts now believe that the 2003 amendment to Rule 
23(c)(1)(B) codified the ascertainability requirement.65 
Courts that find ascertainability to be an implicit requirement of Rule 
23(a) have explained that the term “class” in Rule 23(a) means a definite or 
ascertainable class.66  Thus, these courts have held that a class must be 
ascertainable for the Rule 23(a) requirements to apply,67 and that if a class 
is not ascertainable, then there is no reason to address the numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, or adequacy of representation requirements under 
Rule 23(a).68 
 
 60. Id. (holding that proper identification of the class ensured that those individuals 
actually harmed by the defendant’s wrongful conduct would be the recipients of the awarded 
relief); Gilles, supra note 15, at 311–12 (explaining that the doctrinal foundation of the 
ascertainability requirement is to ensure the manageability of a subsequent distribution of 
damages). 
 61. See In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“Identifying class members is especially important in Rule 23(b)(3) actions, in order to give 
them the notice required by Rule 23(c)(4) so that they may decide whether to exercise their 
right to opt out of the class.”); Dafforn v. Rousseau Assocs., Inc., No. F 75-74, 1976 WL 
1358, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 1976) (finding that the proposed class was not capable of 
ascertainment for purposes of providing notice to class members). 
 62. See, e.g., Agostino v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 256 F.R.D. 437, 479 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 63. See, e.g., Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537–38 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 64. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 44, § 3:2; see, e.g., Robinson v. Gillespie, 219 F.R.D. 179, 
184 (D. Kan. 2003); White v. Williams, 208 F.R.D. 123, 129 (D.N.J. 2002); Buford v. H & 
R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340, 346 (S.D. Ga. 1996). 
 65. 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 43, § 4:2; 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 44, § 3:2; see, e.g., 
Benito v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., No. 2:09-CV-001218-PMP-PAL, 2010 WL 2089297, at *2 
(D. Nev. May 21, 2010).  
 66. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 44, § 3:1. 
 67. See Robinson, 219 F.R.D. at 184 (“‘Absent a cognizable class, determining whether 
Plaintiffs or the putative class satisfy the other Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements is 
unnecessary.’” (quoting Davoll v. Webb, 160 F.R.D. 142, 146 (D. Colo. 1995))); 
1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 44, § 3:1. 
 68. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 44, § 3:2; see, e.g., In re Teflon Prods. Liab. Litig., 254 
F.R.D. 354, 361 n.11 (S.D. Iowa 2008); Robinson, 219 F.R.D. at 184.  
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Some courts now cite Rule 23(c)(1)(B) as authority for the idea that the 
ascertainability requirement has been codified.69  Rule 23(c)(1)(B) states 
that “[a]n order that certifies a class action must define the class and the 
class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel under Rule 
23(g).”70  Thus, in addition to discussing what must be included in the 
certification order, these courts have found that Rule 23(c)(1)(B) also 
requires that the class be ascertainable.71 
3.  Three Categories of Ascertainability Cases 
Whether recognized as an implicit or explicit requirement, 
ascertainability is generally considered a requirement of class 
certification.72  As for when the ascertainability issue arises, the types of 
classes that require ascertainability analysis are often grouped into three 
different categories:  the overbroad class, the difficult-to-identify or 
individualized inquiry class, and the fail-safe class, which will be addressed 
subsequently in Part I.C.73  In practice, a court may identify more than one 
ascertainability problem in finding that a proposed class definition is 
inadequate.74 
Courts have held that a proposed class is overbroad and not ascertainable 
if it encompasses a substantial number of class members that cannot recover 
on the class claims.75  The overbroad class definition often arises in 
situations where the class is defined as all users of a product or service, 
irrespective of whether the users have suffered an injury from the 
defendant’s alleged wrongdoing.76  For example, in Oshana v. Coca-Cola 
 
 69. See, e.g., Benito, 2010 WL 2089297, at *2 (finding that although the ascertainability 
requirement was not expressly stated in Rule 23, Rule 23(c)(1)(B) provided persuasive 
authority for maintaining the implicit ascertainability requirement). 
 70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 71. See, e.g., Riedel v. XTO Energy Inc., 257 F.R.D. 494, 506 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (finding 
that Rule 23 required that any order certifying the class must define the class and then 
address the ascertainability requirement). 
 72. See 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 43, § 4:2; 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 44, § 3:1; 7A 
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, § 1760. 
 73. See generally Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra note 1; Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, 
supra note 38; Feldman, Newman & Schumaker, supra note 38. 
 74. See, e.g., Ind. State Emps. Ass’n, Inc. v. Ind. State Highway Comm’n, 78 F.R.D. 
724, 725–26 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (analyzing the proposed class under both a fail-safe and 
individualized inquiry analysis). 
 75. See Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that a 
proposed class definition was too broad if it included persons who could not have suffered 
an injury from the defendant’s conduct); Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 2–3; 
Feldman, Newman & Schumaker, supra note 38, at 2. 
 76. Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 2; see, e.g., Sanders v. Apple, Inc., 
672 F. Supp. 2d 978, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that because the proposed class 
definition included individuals who did not actually purchase their iMac, individuals who 
were not subject to the allegedly deceptive advertisements, and individuals who were not 
injured by the defendant’s conduct, the class was impermissibly overbroad); In re 
McDonald’s French Fries Litig., 257 F.R.D. 669, 671–72 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that the 
proposed class was overly inclusive because it was not limited to persons who necessarily 
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Co.,77 the named plaintiff alleged that Coca-Cola tricked consumers into 
believing that fountain Diet Coke did not contain artificial saccharin and 
sought to certify a class of all individuals in Illinois who had purchased 
fountain Diet Coke from March 12, 1999, onward.78  The Seventh Circuit 
upheld the district court’s decision not to certify the proposed class,79 
holding that the class could include millions of consumers who might not 
have been deceived by Coke’s marketing because some of Coke’s 
advertisements contained a disclaimer.80  However, an interest in avoiding 
overinclusive class definitions that include some individuals that cannot 
recover against the defendant must be balanced against an interest in 
avoiding fail-safe class definitions that include only those individuals that 
have a valid claim against the defendant.81 
The difficult-to-identify class arises where determining membership in 
the proposed class would be administratively burdensome because it would 
require an individualized inquiry into the facts to determine class 
membership.82  Even if a class definition is defined in terms of objective 
criteria, the definition may still be found inadequate if factual 
determinations must be made prior to deciding whether an individual is a 
member of the class.83  Solo v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.84 dealt with the 
prototypical difficult-to-identify class.  In Solo, plaintiffs filed a class action 
suit against the defendant manufacturer of a contact lens solution, alleging 
that the plaintiffs had suffered economic losses by paying for a defective 
product and discarding it after a recall, because the defendant did not fully 
reimburse plaintiffs for the discarded product.85  The court held that the 
 
saw or knew of the alleged representations regarding the defendant’s potato products’ 
ingredients). 
 77. 472 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 78. Id. at 509.  
 79. Id. at 515. 
 80. Id. at 513–14; see also Frederico, supra note 48 (using Oshana to exemplify the 
problems with an overly broad class).  
 81. See Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“Defining a class so as to avoid, on one hand, being over-inclusive and, on the other hand, 
the fail-safe problem is more of an art than a science.”). 
 82. Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra note 1; Feldman, Newman & Schumaker, supra 
note 38, at 4.  Rule 23(b)(3) classes failing to satisfy the ascertainability requirement because 
identifying class members would require too many individualized determinations often also 
fail to satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements. See, e.g., Melton ex rel. 
Dutton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 283 F.R.D. 280, 293–95 (D.S.C. 2012). 
 83. Fischer, supra note 47, at 51 (explaining that a class definition may be independent 
of the merits and still inadequate when the definition creates minitrials to determine the 
identity of the class members).  A class definition requiring individual factual determinations 
related to the ultimate legal question in the case is distinguishable from the fail-safe class, 
which is actually defined in terms of the ultimate legal questions in the case. See Nudell v. 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. A3-01-41, 2002 WL 1543725, at *3 (D.N.D. July 11, 
2002) (finding that the class definition required individual determinations related to the 
ultimate question of liability but did not create the “classic” fail-safe class). 
 84. Nos. 2:06-MN-77777-DCN, 2:06-CV-02716-DCN, 2009 WL 4287706 (D.S.C. Sept. 
25, 2009). 
 85. Id. at *1–2. 
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class was not ascertainable, as it would require the court to make too many 
individualized determinations, including whether an individual purchased 
the contact lens solution between September 1, 2004, and April 10, 2006, 
how much was purchased and at what price, whether the individual 
discarded the solution, when the solution was discarded, and how much was 
discarded.86 
While courts may analyze a class defined in terms of the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim as a fail-safe class, courts may also analyze a class 
requiring individual merits determinations as a difficult-to-identify class.87  
For instance, in Romberio v. UnumProvident Corp.,88 the Sixth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s grant of class certification, finding that the class 
was inadequately defined.89  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant 
“devised and implemented a corporate-wide scheme to illegally deny or 
terminate the long-term disability claims of thousands” of people, violating 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act90 (ERISA).  The district 
court had certified a class of all plan participants and beneficiaries insured 
under ERISA-governed long-term disability insurance policies—issued by 
the defendant and its subsidiaries—who had long-term disability claims 
denied, terminated, or suspended on or after June 30, 1999, “‘after being 
subjected to any of the practices alleged in the Complaint.’”91  Because 
individualized merits determinations were necessary to determine whether 
an individual was a member of the class, the Sixth Circuit held that the class 
was inadequately defined.92 
Class definitions that turn on subjective criteria, such as a class member’s 
state of mind, are often grouped into the difficult-to-identify category 
because of the administrative burden the criteria poses in determining class 
membership.93  For example, in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University,94 
 
 86. Id. at *6. 
 87. See Feldman, Newman & Schumaker, supra note 38, at 3–4 (grouping class 
definitions that require individual inquiries into the merits with cases requiring individual 
factual inquiries, as both create administrative feasibility problems); see, e.g., Ostler v. Level 
3 Commc’ns, Inc., No. IP 00-0718-C H/K, 2002 WL 31040337, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 27, 
2002) (finding the proposed class fail-safe and virtually unmanageable when it included all 
Indiana landowners whose property rights were violated by the defendant’s installation of 
fiber optic cable); Bledsoe v. Combs, No. NA 99-153-C H/G, 2000 WL 681094, at *4–5 
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 14, 2000) (finding that the class was unmanageable where individualized 
inquiries on the merits of each individual’s claim were necessary to determine class 
membership); Ind. State Emps. Assoc., Inc. v. Ind. State Highway Comm’n, 78 F.R.D. 724, 
725 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (denying class certification after finding that the court would have to 
make individual merit determinations and stage a “mini-trial” on the threshold issue of the 
constitutionality of the defendant’s challenged practice before identifying the class 
members). 
 88. 385 F. App’x 423 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 89. Id. at 433. 
 90. Id. at 425. 
 91. Id. at 427 (quoting In re UnumProvident Corp. ERISA Benefits Denial Actions, 245 
F.R.D. 317, 322 (E.D. Tenn. 2007)).  
 92. Id. at 431. 
 93. Feldman, Newman & Schumaker, supra note 38, at 2–3 (finding that subjective class 
definitions fail to satisfy the ascertainability requirement because the court must spend 
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plaintiffs sought to certify two groups of female athletes whose rights under 
Title IX were allegedly violated.95  The court held that the second group 
definition, “women who have not and will not enroll at Quinnipiac because 
of Quinnipiac’s allegedly discriminatory athletic programming,”96 was not 
ascertainable as it contained subjective criteria requiring individual 
determinations.97 
C.  Fail-Safe Classes 
This section frames fail-safe classes as one category of classes failing to 
satisfy the ascertainability requirement.  First, it describes fail-safe classes 
and provides examples where courts have held that a class definition creates 
a fail-safe class.  It then shows that courts have responded to fail-safe 
classes by denying class certification, modifying the class definition, or 
granting class certification.  Finally, this section explains that courts have 
justified a prohibition against certifying fail-safe classes because fail-safe 
classes evade the bar of res judicata and prevent class members from 
receiving notice and the opportunity to opt out of the action. 
1.  A Primer 
A class definition creates a fail-safe class when the class definition bases 
membership in the class on the validity of the plaintiff’s claims.98  Stated 
differently, for a class definition to create a fail-safe class, the definition 
must be framed in terms of the defendant’s ultimate liability or the central 
legal issue in the plaintiff’s claims.99  Courts have held that a class 
definition is framed in terms of the defendant’s liability and thus creates a 
fail-safe class when there is statutory language embedded in the class 
definition,100 when the verdict is embedded in the class definition,101 or 
 
considerable time and expense to evaluate whether potential class members fall within the 
class definition). 
 94. No. 3:09cv621 (SRU), 2010 WL 2017773 (D. Conn. May 20, 2010). 
 95. Id. at *1; see also Zapka v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 99 CV 8238, 2000 WL 1644539, at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2000) (finding that a class defined as all individuals who consumed 
Diet Coke from the fountain and were deceived by the marketing practices employed by 
Coca-Cola Co. into believing that fountain Diet Coke did not contain saccharin was 
inadequate because it was contingent on the state of mind of the putative class members). 
 96. Biediger, 2010 WL 2017773, at *3. 
 97. Id. at *3–5. 
 98. See Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Ostler v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., No. IP-00-0718-C H/K, 2002 WL 31040337, at *2 (S.D. 
Ind. Aug. 27, 2002); Beisner, Miller & Schwartz, supra note 38, at 5; Feldman, Newman & 
Schumaker, supra note 38, at 4. 
 99. See Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2012); Ind. 
State Emps. Ass’n, Inc. v. Ind. State Highway Comm’n, 78 F.R.D. 724, 725 (S.D. Ind. 
1978); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship:  Is There 
Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1772 (2000). 
 100. See, e.g., Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1169 (S.D. Ind. 1997) 
(finding that the class definition would require the court to address the central issue of 
liability because the class included all persons or entities who received or were currently 
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when there is a reference to a legal right or entitlement.102  The fail-safe 
issue frequently arises in title insurance and wage-and-hour cases, in which 
the class definition often includes “entitled to” or “qualified for” 
language.103 
The fail-safe appellation derives from the notion that the class members 
are not bound by an adverse judgment because they either win or, if they 
lose, are no longer part of the class.104  Members of a fail-safe class are 
defined out of the class if the court enters judgment for the defendant 
because the class is defined such that membership in the class is contingent 
on the validity of the class members’ claims.105 
There are two contexts in which the fail-safe problem can arise:  
(1) where the class is defined in terms of the defendant’s liability with 
respect to the class as a whole, and (2) where the class is defined in terms of 
the validity of an individual class member’s claim.106  In the first instance, a 
determination in favor of the defendant means that the class does not exist, 
and thus no class member is bound by the adverse judgment.107  In the 
second instance, a determination in favor of the defendant against that 
individual class member means that the individual is defined out of the 
class.108  The defendant may still be liable to the individual defined out of 
 
receiving a publication from the defendant via telephone facsimile machine without the prior 
expressed permission of that person or entity). 
 101. See, e.g., Kirts v. Green Bullion Fin. Servs., No. 10-20312-CIV, 2010 WL 3184382, 
at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2010) (denying class certification to a class composed of “[a]ll 
individuals who submitted jewelry to [the defendant] and were damaged because [the 
defendant] broke its promised . . . procedures to handle the jewelry with a high standard of 
care, or fairly appraise the jewelry, or provide an adequate return period”). 
 102. See, e.g., Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(affirming the district court’s decertification order of a class composed of all persons who 
were “entitled to receive the ‘reissue’ or ‘refinance’ rate for title insurance”); Adashunas v. 
Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1980) (affirming an order denying class 
certification to a class including all children within Indiana entitled to a public education 
who had learning disabilities who were not properly identified and/or who were not 
receiving such special instruction). 
 103. See generally Jones-Turner v. Yellow Enter. Sys., LLC, No. 3:07CV-218-S, 2011 
WL 4861882 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011); Campbell v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 68 
(D. Me. 2010); Slapikas v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 250 F.R.D. 232 (W.D. Pa. 2008); 
Chesner v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., No. 1:06CV00476, 2008 WL 553773 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 
23, 2008); Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. CV 07-00101 MMM (Ex), 2008 WL 
8128621 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), aff’d, 492 F. App’x 710 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 104. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Randleman, 646 F.3d at 352. 
 105. See Kirts, 2010 WL 3184382, at *6 (holding that the court would have to make a 
determination that the defendant was liable to an individual before it could conclude that the 
individual was a member of the class). 
 106. Feldman, Newman & Schumaker, supra note 38, at 4–5. 
 107. See, e.g., Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d, 398, 405 (Tex. 2000) (finding the 
proposed class fail-safe because the existence of the entire class was dependent on whether 
the defendant took natural gas from the class members in quantities less than their ratable 
portions). 
 108. See, e.g., Genenbacher v. Centurytel Fiber Co. II, 244 F.R.D. 485, 487–88 (C.D. Ill. 
2007) (finding the class was fail-safe because an individual class member could be defined 
out of the class if the court found that the class member’s property was not subject to an 
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the class, although an adverse judgment may be entered against class 
members not defined out of the class.109 
Because a fail-safe class requires the court to determine the defendant’s 
liability prior to identifying class members,110 the court and the parties must 
wait until a judgment on the merits of the case to determine if there are any 
class members.111  But since an ascertainable class must be capable of 
identification at some stage of the class action prior to final judgment,112 
courts have held that fail-safe classes fail to satisfy the ascertainable 
requirement for class certification.113 
2.  Judicial Responses to Fail-Safe Classes 
Courts take one of three actions after determining that a proposed class is 
fail-safe.  First, some courts have denied class certification outright, either 
finding the fail-safe class definition to be an independent basis for the 
denial of class certification114 or seeing no feasible way to modify the class 
definition.115  Second, other courts have either exercised discretion to 
modify the class definition or have allowed the plaintiff to amend the class 
definition to avoid flatly denying class certification on the basis of the class 
definition.116  Third, one court has explicitly allowed a fail-safe class to be 
 
easement or that the class member gave permission to the defendant to install fiber optic 
cables). 
 109. See Feldman, Newman & Schumaker, supra note 38, at 5. 
 110. 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 43, § 4:2; see also Kirts, 2010 WL 3184382, at *6 
(holding that the proposed class definition was inadequate because it would require the court, 
prior to identifying members of the class, to determine with respect to each potential member 
whether the individual owned the jewelry in question, whether the individual sent jewelry to 
the defendant, and whether the defendant committed any of the misconduct described with 
respect to that individual’s submitted jewelry). 
 111. See 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 43, § 4:2. 
 112. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Schilling v. Kenton Cnty, No. 10-143-DLB, 2011 WL 293759, at *6 (E.D. Ky. 
Jan. 27, 2011); Velasquez v. HSBC Fin. Corp., No. 08-4592 SC, 2009 WL 112919, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Fail-safe classes are defined by the merits of their legal claims, and are 
therefore unascertainable prior to a finding of liability in the plaintiffs’ favor.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(finding that the proposed fail-safe class was one ground to affirm the district court’s 
decision to decertify the class). 
 115. See, e.g., Melton ex rel. Dutton v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 283 F.R.D. 280, 289 
(D.S.C. 2012) (finding that it was unnecessary to attempt to revise the proposed class 
definitions because the proposed class also failed to satisfy the predominance and superiority 
requirements for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)); Eversole v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 
No. 05-124-KSF, 2007 WL 1558512, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007) (holding that the 
proposed class definition created a fail-safe class and that attempting to redefine the class 
would be futile).  Attempting to redefine the class definition may be futile when the class 
definition is only a “symptom” of an inability to satisfy the requirements for class 
certification. Frederico, supra note 48. 
 116. See, e.g., Campbell v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 68, 73–74 (D. Me. 2010) 
(redefining the class to avoid the fail-safe problem by eliminating the “‘qualified for the 
refinance rate’” language); Slapikas v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 250 F.R.D. 232, 250–51 
(W.D. Pa. 2008) (modifying the class definition by replacing the “‘qualified for’” language 
with objective criteria to overcome the fail-safe issue with the initially proposed class).  
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maintained as a class action, not recognizing the fail-safe class definition as 
a basis for denying class certification.117 
A court’s decision whether to modify a class definition after designating 
that the class definition creates a proscribed fail-safe class is a matter of 
broad judicial discretion.118  Rule 23(c)(1)(C), which allows an order that 
grants or denies class certification to be altered or amended prior to final 
judgment,119 has been used to support inherent flexibility in Rule 23 for 
judicial modification of class definitions.120 
3.  Justifications for Denying Class Certification to Fail-Safe Classes 
This section outlines two reasons courts have offered for disallowing the 
certification of fail-safe classes.  While many courts find that fail-safe 
classes violate res judicata by allowing class members to relitigate claims 
against the defendant, some courts also justify the denial of class 
certification due to a concern that fail-safe classes do not afford class 
members notice and the opportunity to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. 
a.  Fail-Safe Classes Evade the Bar of Res Judicata 
One reason that courts deny class certification to a proposed fail-safe 
class is that certifying a fail-safe class allows the class to circumvent res 
judicata.121  Res judicata,122 or claim preclusion, bars future litigants from 
reasserting the same claim between the same parties that a court has already 
 
Sometimes these modified classes nevertheless cannot be certified because they fail other 
requirements. See, e.g., Ostler v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., No. IP 00-0718-C H/K, 2002 WL 
31040337, at *2–3, *9 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 27, 2002) (redefining the initially proposed fail-safe 
class but denying class certification because the modified class was unmanageable); Dafforn 
v. Rousseau Assocs., Inc., No. F 75-74, 1976 WL 1358, at *1–2, *6–7 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 
1976) (modifying the class definition to avoid the fail-safe problem but denying class 
certification because no classwide injury existed under the amended class definition). 
 117. See In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 369–70 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 118. Chesner v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., No. 1:06CV00476, 2008 WL 553773, at *4 
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2008) (redefining the class to avoid “entitlement” language and instead 
making class membership contingent on whether the property being financed was mortgaged 
during the look-back period); Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. CV 07-00101 
MMM (Ex), 2008 WL 8128621, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (exercising discretion to 
consider the class definition as defined in the complaint under the Rule 23 analysis as 
opposed to the ill-defined class set forth in the plaintiffs’ motion), aff’d, 492 F. App’x 710 
(9th Cir. 2012); see also 3 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 8:12 (4th ed. 2002). 
 119. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C). 
 120. 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 118, § 8:12.  Rule 23(c)(5) can also support 
inherent flexibility, stating that “[w]hen appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses 
that are each treated as a class under this rule.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). 
 121. See Kissling v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., No. 5:10-22-JMH, 2010 WL 1978862, at *2–3 
(E.D. Ky. May 14, 2010); Allen v. Holiday Universal, 249 F.R.D. 166, 176 (E.D. Pa. 2008); 
Eversole v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 05-124-KSF, 2007 WL 1558512, at *4–6 (E.D. Ky. 
May 29, 2007); Ostler, 2002 WL 31040337, at *2–3. 
 122. The term res judicata literally means, “a thing adjudicated.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1425 (9th ed. 2009). 
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determined in earlier litigation with a final judgment on the merits.123  If the 
new claim arises from the same “common nucleus of operative fact” at 
issue in the earlier litigation, the new claim is barred.124  While the general 
rule of res judicata is that a judgment is not binding on nonparties that have 
not been served with process,125 one exception to this rule is that a 
judgment in a class action may bind absent parties if their interests are 
adequately represented.126  In class actions, the claims brought on behalf of 
the class merge into the judgment for or against the class.127 
There are limitations on the applicability of res judicata to absent class 
members due to the due process issues associated with binding absent class 
members to a judgment.128  First, absent class members must have notice 
and the ability to opt out of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), or else 
preclusion of later actions would violate the class members’ due process 
rights.129  Also, while a final judgment after class certification will be 
binding on absent class members, a decision to deny class certification is 
not res judicata against the absent class members.130  Further, an absent 
class member is only bound by judgment with respect to classwide issues, 
not issues unique to the named plaintiffs.131 
Prior to the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, the binding effect of a judgment 
in a class action depended on how the lawsuit was characterized.132  A 
“true” class action involved “joint, common or secondary rights,” a 
“hybrid” class action involved “several” rights to “specific property,” and 
the “spurious” class action involved “several” rights affected by a common 
question and related to common relief.133  While the judgment in a true 
class action was binding on all class members134 and a judgment in a hybrid 
class action bound the class members with regard to the rights to the 
specific property in controversy,135 a “spurious” class action bound only 
 
 123. See Fischer, supra note 47, at 605. 
 124. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
 125. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877). 
 126. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41–42 (1940); Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away:  
Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in Class Actions, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1079, 
1088–89. 
 127. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984). 
 128. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 44–45. 
 129. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950). 
 130. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380–82 (2011) (holding that a grant of 
summary judgment entered against an uncertified class only bound the named class 
members). 
 131. See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 878 (holding the absent class members were not bound by 
the court’s ruling on unique issues raised by the named class members). 
 132. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966 amendment) (recognizing that 
prior to the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, class actions were categorized based on the abstract 
nature of the rights involved); see also Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1554, 1555 (1968); Bassett, supra note 126, at 1084–86. 
 133. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966 amendment). 
 134. See generally Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Shipley 
v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947). 
 135. See generally Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1952). 
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those parties before the court.136  In a spurious class action, if there was a 
judgment for the class, class members could opt in to get relief from the 
court.137  However, if there was an adverse judgment, the class members 
were not bound by the decision and were free to relitigate the claims.138  By 
allowing class members in a spurious class action to only obtain the 
benefits of a favorable judgment, spurious class actions allowed for one-
way intervention.139  The one-way intervention permitted in spurious class 
actions “undercut the central objectives of the class action device” by 
failing to adjudicate the rights of nonparties.140 
The 1966 amendment to Rule 23 rejected the one-way intervention that 
had been allowed in spurious class actions.141  Rule 23(c)(3) now states that 
whether favorable or not to the class, a judgment in a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 
23(b)(2) class action must include and describe those whom the court finds 
to be members of the class.142  A judgment in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, 
whether or not favorable to the class, must specify those to whom notice 
was directed, those who have not opted out, and those whom the court finds 
to be class members.143  Thus, under the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, a 
favorable or adverse judgment must bind all individuals the court finds to 
be class members.144  While under Rule 23(c)(3) the court determines the 
extent of the judgment by specifying those bound by the judgment, the 
preclusive effect of a court’s judgment will be determined in the subsequent 
suit in which the claims are brought.145 
Some courts have therefore found that certifying a fail-safe class allows 
the class to escape the bar of res judicata because class members are bound 
 
 136. See generally Bronson v. Bd. of Educ., 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975). 
 137. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588–89 (10th Cir. 1961) 
(characterizing spurious class actions as a permissive joinder device because such actions 
allowed the joinder of parties whose claims involve a common question of law or fact). 
 138. Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class 
Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 348 (1988); see, e.g., Fox v. Glickman Corp., 355 
F.2d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 139. See 1 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 43, § 1:1. 
 140. Id.; see also supra notes 11–18 and accompanying text (introducing the central 
objectives and features of class actions). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966 amendment); see also Robert G. 
Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 
1261–62 (2002) (“[C]lass actions under the 1966 revision were all meant to have full res 
judicata effect.  The 1966 Rule drafters made perfectly clear . . . that the entire point of the 
class action procedure was to adjudicate individual claims in one proceeding with full 
binding effect on each and every class member.”). 
 142. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(A); see also Genenbacher v. CenturyTel Fiber Co. II, 244 
F.R.D. 485, 487–88 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (holding that because the class members would either 
win or not be in the class, the proposed class was fail-safe and violated Rule 23(c)(3)). 
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(B). 
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966 amendment); see also 
Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 
1987) (“The revision of Rule 23 in 1966 does away with one-way intervention in class 
actions. . . .  Whether class members should get the benefit of a favorable judgment, despite 
not being bound by an unfavorable judgment, was considered and decided in 1966.”). 
 145. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966 amendment); see also 
Harrison v. Lewis, 559 F. Supp. 943, 947 (D.D.C. 1983). 
 2788 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
only by a favorable judgment.146  If there is a judgment for the defendant, 
class members defined out of the class can relitigate their claims against the 
defendant.147  Some courts have taken this argument one step further and 
asserted that certifying a fail-safe class reinstates one-way intervention by 
allowing class members to seek a remedy without ever being bound by an 
adverse judgment.148 
b.  Fail-Safe Classes Prevent Notice and the Ability To Opt Out 
Some courts have denied class certification to fail-safe classes because 
fail-safe classes prevent absent class members from receiving the requisite 
notice149 and ability to opt out of the class150 prior to final judgment, as 
required for classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3).151  Since a fail-safe class 
definition is framed in terms of the defendant’s ultimate liability, class 
members cannot be identified until there is a final determination on the 
merits.152  And if class members cannot be identified until a final judgment, 
then the absent class members cannot be provided with notice or the 
opportunity to opt out prior to that final judgment.153  Because fail-safe 
classes are not capable of ascertainment, they prevent class members in a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class from receiving notice and the opportunity to opt out, 
which are required to safeguard the rights of absent class members in a 
class action.154 
II.  THE CIRCUITS ADDRESS THE FAIL-SAFE PROBLEM 
Part I presented fail-safe classes as one category of cases held to fail the 
ascertainability requirement for class certification.  Part II examines the 
conflicting treatment of fail-safe classes by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits 
 
 146. See, e.g., Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1980) ( citing Dafforn v. 
Rousseau Assocs., Inc., No. F 75-74, 1976 WL 1358, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 1976)); 
Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. CV 07-00101 MMM (Ex), 2008 WL 8128621, at 
*10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), aff’d, 492 F. App’x 710 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 147. See Dafforn, 1976 WL 1358, at *1. 
 148. See Kissling v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., No. 5:10-22-JMH, 2010 WL 1978862, at *2–3 
(E.D. Ky. May 14, 2010); Allen v. Holiday Universal, 249 F.R.D. 166, 175 (E.D. Pa. 2008) 
(finding that fail-safe classes violated the rule against one-way intervention but that the 
proposed class was not fail-safe); Eversole v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 05-124-KSF, 2007 
WL 1558512, at *4–6 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007); Ostler v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., No. IP 
00-0718-C H/K, 2002 WL 31040337, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 27, 2002).  
 149. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Kamar v. RadioShack Corp., 375 F. App’x 734, 736 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
fail-safe classes were problematic because notice could not be directed to members of a fail-
safe class); Wanty v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., No. 05-CV-0350, 2006 WL 2691076, at *3 
(E.D. Wis. Sept. 19, 2006) (finding the class definition inadequate because the court wanted 
to avoid a final determination on the merits before the class members had the ability to opt 
out of the class); supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Schilling v. Kenton Cnty., No. 10-143-DLB, 2011 WL 293759, at *6 (E.D. Ky. 
Jan. 27, 2011). 
 153. See id. (citing Kamar, 375 F. App’x at 735).   
 154. See id. 
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as compared to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.  Parts II.A–C show that while 
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have prohibited fail-safe classes from class 
certification, the Fifth Circuit has held that a fail-safe class is not outright 
barred from class certification.  Part II.D explains that while the Ninth 
Circuit has not explicitly prohibited fail-safe classes, it has applied Fifth 
Circuit case law to reject a challenge that the originally certified class 
definition was circular. 
A.  The Sixth Circuit 
Two recent cases illustrate the Sixth Circuit’s view that fail-safe classes 
are categorically precluded from being certified, albeit in different ways:  
Randleman v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.155 and Young v. 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.156  This section addresses each in turn.   
1.  Randleman v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. 
Randleman was the first Sixth Circuit case to explicitly address whether a 
proposed fail-safe class could be certified.157  The plaintiffs appealed the 
district court’s decision to decertify the class in an action against the 
defendant title insurance company.158  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant failed to provide the required discount rate when issuing title 
insurance to homeowners who had purchased a policy for the same property 
from any other insurer within the previous ten years.159  The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decertification order, holding that the initially 
certified class was an improper fail-safe class.160 
The initially certified class included all persons who had paid for title 
insurance issued by the defendant in connection with the refinancing of a 
residential mortgage loan who were “entitled to receive the ‘reissue’ or 
‘refinance’ rate for title insurance.”161  The Sixth Circuit held that this was 
a fail-safe class, as it only included those entitled to relief, thereby shielding 
the class members from receiving an adverse judgment.162  The court stated 
that the fail-safe nature of the class provided an “independent” justification 
 
 155. 646 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 156. 693 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 157. See Randleman, 646 F.3d at 349; Campbell, supra note 4. 
 158. Randleman, 646 F.3d at 349.  While this case also discussed other plaintiffs—the 
Hickmans, who filed similar claims against the defendant—this analysis is exclusively 
confined to the Randlemans because the Hickmans’ proposed class did not include the 
proscribed entitlement language. See id. at 351.  
 159. Id. at 349.  
 160. Id. at 352 (finding the fail-safe class was one of two grounds for denying class 
certification). 
 161. Id. at 350. 
 162. Id. at 352; cf. Chesner v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., No. 1:06CV00476, 2008 WL 
553773, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2008) (modifying the proposed class definition, which 
was defined in terms of whether an individual was entitled to the reissue or refinance rate to 
avoid the denial of class certification). But see Alberton v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. 
Co., 264 F.R.D. 203, 206–07 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding that a class including individuals who 
were not charged the reissue or refinance rate was not fail-safe). 
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for denying class certification,163 even though it also analyzed the class’s 
ability to meet the predominance requirement164—which was the basis for 
the district court’s decertification decision.165 
The Sixth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding that common issues did not predominate.166  Since substantial 
individual inquiries were necessary to determine liability, the predominance 
requirement was not satisfied.167  Because the originally certified class was 
a “flawed” fail-safe class and the class failed to satisfy the predominance 
requirement, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decertification 
order.168 
2.  Young v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 
Young, the most recent Sixth Circuit case to address whether a fail-safe 
class can be certified, rejected the defendants’ challenge that the class 
definition created a fail-safe class.169   
Insurance policyholders brought an action against their insurers, alleging 
that the insurers charged them a local government tax on the premiums the 
insurers collected when either the tax was not owed to the local 
governments or when the amount owed was less than what the insurer 
billed the insureds.170  The district court subdivided the plaintiffs into ten 
subclasses, each comprising one of the remaining ten defendants, and 
severed the subclasses into separate actions.171  The district court then 
certified the subclasses, defined as all persons in Kentucky who purchased 
insurance from or were underwritten by the defendant and who were 
charged local government taxes on their payment of premiums that were 
either not owed or owed at rates higher than permitted.172 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the class definition created an 
impermissible fail-safe class and was not administratively feasible,173 
 
 163. Randleman, 646 F.3d at 352. 
 164. Id. at 352–55; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 165. Randleman, 646 F.3d at 352. 
 166. Id. at 355; see also Schilling v. Kenton Cnty., No. 10-143-DLB, 2011 WL 293759, 
at *9 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2011) (finding that the proposed fail-safe class failed to meet the 
commonality requirement as each class members’ claim necessitated an individualized 
determination of liability); Eversole v. EMC Mortg. Corp., No. 05-124-KSF, 2007 WL 
1558512, at *13–14 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007) (finding that the proposed fail-safe class 
definition failed to meet the commonality and predominance requirements as individual 
actions heavily predominated over common issues). 
 167. Randleman, 646 F.3d at 355. 
 168. Id. at 352, 356. 
 169. Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 170. Id. at 535. 
 171. Id. at 536. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (discussing how classes are often 
challenged on both fail-safe and administrative feasibility grounds).  In Young, the Sixth 
Circuit found that the administrative feasibility argument was really an argument related to 
fulfilling the definiteness requirement and held that the criteria in the class definition was 
objective and not determinative of the ultimate issue of liability. 693 F.3d at 538. 
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because the determination of whether premium taxes were charged that 
were not owed or were charged at rates higher than permitted went to the 
heart of the class claims.174  The defendant argued that the class was fail-
safe because it required the Sixth Circuit to determine the ultimate legal 
issue of whether the individual insureds were charged too much, which was 
the same question necessary to identify the class members.175 
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that fail-safe classes were prohibited 
under Randleman176 because members of a fail-safe class either won or, as 
a result of losing, were defined out of the class.177  The court also 
articulated that fail-safe classes should not be certified because they do not 
allow for the “final resolution of the claims of all class members that is 
envisioned in class action litigation.”178  However, the court held that, in 
this instance, the proposed class was not fail-safe.179  A fail-safe class must 
include “only those who are entitled to relief,” and the present class 
included both those entitled and not entitled to relief—an insight the court 
gleaned from the defendants arguing that they were not ultimately liable to 
many of the class members.180   
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the defendants’ argument that the class 
definition revealed the fundamental flaw in the case, which was that claims 
for individual tax overcharges lack the predominant common issues 
necessary for class certification.181  While the defendants argued that there 
was no uniform institutional policy that affected the tax jurisdiction 
assignment of each policyholder,182 the Sixth Circuit found that common 
proof of causation was a predominant issue for all the plaintiffs’ claims.183  
After finding that the proposed subclasses met the Rule 23(a) and (b) 
requirements for class certification, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of class certification.184 
B.  The Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit has also barred the certification of fail-safe classes 
but has not definitively addressed whether fail-safe classes independently 
bar class certification.  It has, however, articulated that courts should work 
to amend fail-safe class definitions to avoid flatly denying class 
 
 174. Young, 693 F.3d at 538. 
 175. Id.; see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 3–9, Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
693 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5015), 2011 WL 2191625. 
 176. Young, 693 F.3d at 538.  However, the court stopped short of saying, as it did in 
Randleman, that the fail-safe class was an independent reason to bar class certification. Id.  
 177. Id. (citing Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2011)). 
 178. Id.; see also supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text (describing how the class 
action device enables consistency in judgments and conserves judicial resources).  
 179. Young, 693 F.3d at 538. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id.; see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, Young, 693 F.3d 532 (No. 11-5015), 
2011 WL 2191625. 
 182. See Young, 693 F.3d at 538. 
 183. Id. at 544–45. 
 184. Id. at 546. 
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certification on fail-safe grounds.  These views can be collectively found in 
Dafforn v. Rousseau Associates, Inc.185 and Messner v. Northshore 
University HealthSystem.186 
1.  Dafforn v. Rousseau Associates, Inc. 
In Dafforn, the court modified the class definition to avoid denying class 
certification for failing to propose an ascertainable class but ultimately 
rejected class certification after finding that the amended class failed to 
meet the requirement of a “classwide injury.”187  While it is a district court 
case, Dafforn has informed the Seventh Circuit’s own views, as is evident 
from Part II.B.2.188   
The plaintiffs in Dafforn—sellers of single-family, previously occupied 
dwellings—brought a private antitrust action against the defendants, real 
estate brokers who offered brokering services for single-family, previously 
occupied homes.189  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants fixed or 
agreed to fix the rates that they charged for their brokerage services190 and 
moved to certify an amended class, including all sellers of previously 
occupied single-family dwellings located in Allen County, Indiana, who 
obtained, purchased, or used the service of the defendants, compensating 
the defendants by paying an artificially fixed and illegal brokerage fee.191  
As defined in the complaint, the class was comprised of all sellers of 
previously occupied single-family dwellings located in Allen County who 
obtained, purchased, or used the service of the defendants, compensating 
the defendants for their services.192 
The court held that the addition of the “an artificially fixed and illegal 
brokerage fee” language in the amended definition created a “fail-safe 
class,” only bound by a judgment favorable to the plaintiffs.193  Finding that 
fail-safe classes were impermissible, the court noted that a class must be 
defined such that all members—except those who opt out—were bound by 
either a favorable or adverse judgment.194  The added language to the class 
definition created a fail-safe class because a jury determination that the 
defendants did not charge illegal fees would mean that no class existed and 
absent class members would be free to relitigate the legality of the 
 
 185. No. F 75-74, 1976 WL 1358 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 1976). 
 186. 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 187. Dafforn, 1976 WL 1358, at *4. 
 188. See also Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1980) (relying on 
Dafforn to affirm the denial of class certification to a fail-safe class but failing to address 
whether proposing a fail-safe class independently barred class certification). 
 189. Dafforn, 1976 WL 1358, at *1.  
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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defendants’ fees.195  Moreover, the court noted that the inadequacy of the 
class definition made the requisite notice under Rule 23 impossible because 
the class members could not be identified until there was a determination on 
the merits.196  Based on the amended class definition, the Seventh Circuit 
would not certify the class as defined in the amended class definition.197 
Because the court found that the parties assumed that the operative class 
definition consisted of all homeowners who utilized the defendants’ 
services in the sale of a single-family home, the court chose to use this 
“neutral” class definition.198  Finding that this modified class definition 
avoided the ascertainability problems inherent in the proposed class 
definition, the court proceeded under Rule 23 analysis.199  The court 
ultimately denied class certification after engaging in Rule 23 analysis 
because there was not the requisite common injury-in-fact and the court 
would have had to make an individual inquiry into each member’s injury.200 
2.  Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem 
In Messner, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether a proposed fail-safe 
class must be denied class certification in the context of a challenge that the 
proposed class was overbroad.201  While the Seventh Circuit held that class 
definitions that created fail-safe classes were “improper,” the court did not 
explicitly state whether fail-safe classes independently precluded class 
certification.202 
The plaintiffs alleged that a merger between the defendant and Highland 
Park Hospital violated federal antitrust law, and sought certification of a 
class of individual patients and third-party payors who allegedly paid higher 
prices for hospital care as a result of the merger.203  The district court 
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, finding that, because 
there was a lack of uniformity in price increases affecting the class 
members to the same degree, the predominance requirement could not be 
met.204 
On appeal, the defendant objected to class certification on the grounds 
that the class was overbroad.205  The defendant argued that the class 
contained individuals who could not have been harmed by any postmerger 
price increase, including those who met their annual plan out-of-pocket 
 
 195. Id. (“Rule 23 was never meant to be an exception to the rules of res judicata or to 
provide a risk-free method of litigation.”). 
 196. Id. at *2. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at *3. 
 201. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 202. See id.  
 203. Id. at 808. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 824; see also supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text (describing the 
overbroad class as an ascertainability problem).  
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maximum or their deductible regardless of any price increases and those 
whose contracts protected against price increases.206  The Seventh Circuit 
held that the class was not so overly broad as to require denial of class 
certification.207 
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the problem of fail-safe classes, 
recognizing that fail-safe classes are “improper” because a class member 
“either wins or, by virtue of losing, is defined out of the class and is 
therefore not bound by the judgment.”208  The court distinguished the 
problem of the overbroad class from the fail-safe class:  while the overbroad 
class included class members whose claims might fail on the merits for 
individual reasons, a fail-safe class was defined so that whether a person 
qualified as a member depended on whether the person had a valid claim.209  
However, while the Seventh Circuit held that fail-safe classes were 
problematic, it noted that such claims should be dealt with by amending the 
class definition because “[d]efining a class so as to avoid, on one hand, 
being over-inclusive and, on the other hand, the fail-safe problem is more of 
an art than a science.”210 
The Seventh Circuit found that the district court’s conclusion that a lack 
of uniform price increases required a denial of class certification was an 
abuse of discretion, and thus vacated the decision and remanded the case.211 
C.  The Fifth Circuit 
In contrast with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the Fifth Circuit has 
explicitly rejected a prohibition against fail-safe classes.  While in Forbush 
v. J.C. Penney Co.212 and Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino213 the Fifth 
Circuit rejected challenges that the class definitions were circular,214 in In 
re Rodriguez,215 the Fifth Circuit interpreted Forbush and Mullen as having 
rejected a prohibition against fail-safe classes and explicitly disclaimed a 
prohibition against certifying fail-safe classes.216 
 
 206. Messner, 669 F.3d at 824. 
 207. Id. at 825–26.  
 208. Id. at 825 (citing Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1980)).  
 209. Id.; cf. Genenbacher v. CenturyTel Fiber Co. II, 244 F.R.D. 485, 488 (C.D. Ill. 2007) 
(denying class certification because the proposed class was fail-safe, as the court could not 
enter an unfavorable judgment enforceable against at least some of the proposed class 
members). 
 210. Messner, 669 F.3d at 825; see also Melton ex. rel. Dutton v. Carolina Power & Light 
Co., 283 F.R.D. 280, 289 (D.S.C. 2012) (recognizing that Messner held that courts should 
attempt to redefine the class when practicable before flatly denying class certification but 
holding that an attempt at redefinition was unnecessary when the proposed class also failed 
to satisfy predominance and superiority). 
 211. Messner, 669 F.3d at 808. 
 212. 994 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 213. 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 214. Id. at 624 n.1; Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1103–05. 
 215. 695 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 216. Id. at 369–70. 
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1.  Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co. 
In Forbush, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying 
class certification, overruling an argument that the class definition required 
liability determinations before class members could be identified.217  While 
the defendant in Forbush did not challenge the proposed class for being 
fail-safe, the Fifth Circuit later held that the Forbush court had rejected a 
prohibition against fail-safe classes.218 
The plaintiff filed a class action suit against her former employer alleging 
that the defendant’s plan of estimating Social Security benefits violated 
ERISA.219  The plaintiff moved to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of all 
of the defendant’s former and current employees who were employed by 
the defendant before January 1, 1976, who had or might obtain a vested 
right to benefits under the pension plan, and whose pension benefits had 
been or would have been reduced or eliminated as a result of the plan’s 
overestimation of their Social Security benefits.220  Finding the proposed 
class problematic, as individualized issues would have to be resolved in 
each case before the class members would have been entitled to relief, the 
district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for class certification.221 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the proposed class definition was 
“hopelessly ‘circular,’”222 as the court had to first determine whether an 
employee’s pension benefits were improperly reduced before that person 
could be identified as a member of the class.223  The Fifth Circuit found that 
the defendant’s argument was without merit and, if sustained by the court, 
would preclude certification of any class alleging injury from a particular 
action.224  Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that the proposed class was 
linked by a common complaint and “the possibility that some may fail to 
prevail on their individual claims will not defeat class membership.”225 
 
 217. Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1103–06. 
 218. See In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d at 370 (noting that the Forbush court had rejected a 
prohibition against fail-safe classes). 
 219. Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1103. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1103–04. 
 222. Id. at 1105; see also In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d at 370 (finding that the Fifth Circuit 
had rejected a rule against fail-safe classes by dismissing the defendant’s challenge that the 
class was “hopelessly ‘circular’”); Mims v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 254 F.R.D. 482, 486 
(N.D. Tex. 2008) (using “fail-safe” and “circular” interchangeably to describe class 
definition framed in terms of a liability determination), rev’d and remanded on other 
grounds, 590 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 223. Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1105. 
 224. Id. But see Heffelfinger v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. CV 07-00101 MMM (Ex), 
2008 WL 8128621, at *10 n.57 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (finding that the Fifth Circuit in 
Forbush only addressed whether a poorly drafted class definition should be denied class 
certification outright and failed to consider the underlying problem raised by fail-safe 
classes), aff’d, 492 F. App’x 710 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 225. Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1105. 
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The court held that the defendant’s argument regarding the specificity of 
the class definition was really a commonality argument.226  It nevertheless 
rejected that argument, holding that the common issue was whether the 
defendant’s alleged overestimation of social security benefits violated 
ERISA’s nonforfeiture provisions.227  Finding that the Rule 23(a) and (b) 
requirements were satisfied, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
order denying class certification.228 
2.  Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino 
In Mullen, the Fifth Circuit relied on Forbush to reject the defendant’s 
challenge on appeal that the class was not capable of objective 
identification prior to class certification.229  Years later, Rodriguez held that 
the Mullen court had rejected a prohibition against fail-safe classes.230 
In Mullen, former employees of the defendant alleged that they suffered 
respiratory illness purportedly caused by the defendant’s defective air 
conditioning and ventilating system.231  The plaintiffs moved to certify a 
class of all members of the defendant’s crew who were stricken with 
occupational respiratory illness caused or exacerbated by the defective 
ventilation system in place aboard the defendant’s boat.232  The district 
court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3).233 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the class was not ascertainable 
because being a member of the class was contingent upon the ultimate issue 
of causation:  whether the class member’s illness was caused or exacerbated 
by the defective ventilation system.234  The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim, 
holding that this argument was dismissed in Forbush, where the Fifth 
Circuit held that if persons were linked by a common complaint, a class 
defined with reference to the ultimate issue in the case did not prevent class 
certification.235  Finding that the class was similarly linked by a common 
complaint, the Fifth Circuit did not reject class certification on the basis of 
the class definition.236  The Fifth Circuit subsequently affirmed the district 
court’s grant of class certification, finding that certification requirements 
were satisfied.237 
 
 226. Id. at 1105–06. 
 227. Id. at 1106. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, 186 F.3d 620, 624 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 230. In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 231. Mullen, 186 F.3d at 623. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 624 n.1. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 629. 
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3.  In re Rodriguez 
The Fifth Circuit addressed the fail-safe issue most recently in Rodriguez, 
interpreting prior Fifth Circuit case law as having rejected a prohibition 
against certifying fail-safe classes.238  In Rodriguez, former Chapter 13 
debtors brought a class action against a mortgage loan servicer, alleging that 
the loan servicer’s fee collection practices violated Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 2016(a) by threatening foreclosure on their homes if 
they did not pay unauthorized fees that were charged while their bankruptcy 
cases were still pending.239  The plaintiffs moved to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) 
and a Rule 23(b)(3) class.240 
While the bankruptcy court granted narrow class certification for the 
plaintiffs’ injunctive relief claim, it redefined the class to include 
individuals who owed funds on a defendant-serviced note; who had not 
fully paid the relevant mortgage note, fees, or costs owed to the defendant; 
who filed a Chapter 13 proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas; and to whom the defendant assessed a fee after 
the filing of a bankruptcy petition and before the individual received a 
Chapter 13 discharge.241 
The defendant challenged the bankruptcy court’s certification of the 
class, arguing that the bankruptcy court certified a fail-safe class whose 
membership could only be ascertained by a determination of the merits of 
the case because the class was defined in terms of the defendant’s ultimate 
liability.242  After noting that the defendant failed to cite a case where the 
Fifth Circuit had rejected a fail-safe class, the Fifth Circuit held that it had 
actually rejected a rule against fail-safe classes in both Mullen and 
Forbush.243  The court cited the proposition in Forbush on which Mullen 
later relied:  that if persons were linked by a common complaint, then the 
possibility that some may fail to prevail on their individual claims would 
not preclude class membership.244  Finding that Fifth Circuit precedent 
rejected an outright prohibition against fail-safe classes, the court rejected 
the defendant’s argument that the bankruptcy court adopted an improper 
class definition.245  It affirmed the bankruptcy court’s certification of the 
 
 238. In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 239. Id. at 362–63. 
 240. Id. at 363. 
 241. Id. at 363–64. 
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injunctive class, the bankruptcy court’s class definition, and the denial of 
the defendant’s motion for reconsideration.246 
D.  The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit has neither explicitly prohibited nor rejected a 
prohibition against certifying fail-safe classes.  In Vizcaino v. U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington,247 the Ninth Circuit relied on 
Fifth Circuit case law to reject a challenge that a certified class was 
circular.248  However, subsequent case law—Kamar v. RadioShack 
Corp.249 and Heffelfinger v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.250—has created 
uncertainty over whether the Ninth Circuit has precluded fail-safe classes 
from class certification.251   
1.  Vizcaino v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington 
Although the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly reject a fail-safe class 
definition in Vizcaino, it rejected the district court’s position that the class 
definition was “circular” because it was framed in terms of the common 
legal issue linking the class members’ claims.252  In finding that the class 
definition as originally certified was permissible, the Ninth Circuit relied on 
Fifth Circuit cases that were later interpreted by the Fifth Circuit as 
rejecting a prohibition against fail-safe classes.253 
In Vizcaino, former independent contractors brought an action on behalf 
of persons employed by the defendant who met the definition of employees 
under common law but who were denied employment benefits because the 
defendant considered them independent contractors or employees of third-
party employment agencies.254  The district court originally certified a class 
of all persons employed by the defendant who were denied employee 
benefits because they were considered independent contractors or 
employees of third-party employment agencies, but who met the definition 
of employees under common law.255 
Following denial of relief by the district court and subsequent reversal 
and remand by the Ninth Circuit, the district court revised its prior class 
 
 246. Id. at 371.  
 247. 173 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1999), amended, 184 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 248. Id. at 722. 
 249. 375 F. App’x 734 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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 251. Kamar, 375 F. App’x at 736; Heffelfinger, 2008 WL 8128621, at *10 n.57, *11. 
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 253. See id.; Heffelfinger, 2008 WL 8128621, at *10 n.57 (recognizing that the Ninth 
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“blanket prohibition” against fail-safe classes). 
 254. Vizcaino, 173 F.3d at 716–18. 
 255. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., No. C93-178D, 1993 WL 1622929, at *6 (W.D. 
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definition.256  The revised definition limited the class to all of the 
defendant’s workers who, like the named plaintiffs, worked as independent 
contractors and whose positions were reclassified as employee positions 
after the defendant reviewed them.257  The plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth 
Circuit to vacate the district court’s orders reducing the plaintiff class and to 
reinstate the original class definition.258 
In finding that the Ninth Circuit’s prior mandate to the district court did 
not leave room for the district court to redefine the class definition, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s position that “unusual 
circumstances” permitted redefinition was baseless.259  The Ninth Circuit 
noted that the “unusual circumstances” arose from the district court’s 
perception that the class as originally defined was “circular.”260  However, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the original class definition was not circular, as 
success of a claim hinging on the resolution of a disputed legal issue did not 
make a class definition circular.261  Comparing the case to Forbush, where 
the Fifth Circuit rejected an argument that the class was “hopelessly 
‘circular,’” the Ninth Circuit found that defining a class of employees as 
linked by the common claim of having been denied benefits to which they 
were entitled was no more circular than defining a class of employees by 
the common claim of having been injured by their employer’s unlawful 
actions.262  The Ninth Circuit therefore rejected the district court’s position 
that the class definition was circular and needed modification.263 
2.  Kamar v. RadioShack Corp. 
In Kamar, the Ninth Circuit found that the class was adequately defined 
and affirmed the district court’s grant of class certification.264  While the 
court rejected a challenge that the proposed class was “fail-safe” or 
“circular,”265 it did not determine whether proposing a fail-safe class barred 
certification.266  In rejecting the fail-safe challenge, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged the deficits of fail-safe classes and did not cite to, or 
recognize, Vizcaino as establishing a precedent that fail-safe classes are not 
precluded from class certification.267 
 
 256. Vizcaino, 173 F.3d at 716–18. 
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 2800 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
In Kamar, former employees filed a class action against the defendant, 
alleging that the defendant failed to compensate hourly nonexempt 
employees for reporting time pay for mandatory meetings and for split shift 
premium pay.268  The district court certified a class of California employees 
who were instructed to work a Saturday meeting and/or a split shift without 
receiving the full amount of mandated premium pay.269  On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the district court had erroneously certified a fail-safe 
class because class membership depended on whether class members were 
entitled to the mandated pay.270 
First, the Ninth Circuit noted that defining a class that precluded 
membership unless the liability of the defendant was established was 
“palpably unfair” to the defendant and “unmanageable.”271  However, the 
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the defendant that the class definition created a 
fail-safe class where class membership was predicated on the validity of the 
class claims and where the defendant was not protected against liability if a 
class member was not legally wronged.272  Instead, the class definition 
merely narrowed the class to employees within the reporting time and split-
shift classifications “without actually distinguishing between those who 
may and those who may not ultimately turn out to be entitled to premium 
pay.”273  After finding the class was adequately defined, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of class certification.274 
3.  Heffelfinger v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. 
While not a Ninth Circuit case, this Central District of California case 
later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit modified the class definition to avoid 
certifying a proposed fail-safe class.275  Although the court recognized that 
the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Forbush in Vizcaino casted doubt over 
whether there was a prohibition against certifying fail-safe classes,276 the 
court exercised its broad discretion to redefine the class to avoid denying 
class certification.277 
In Heffelfinger, the plaintiffs filed a class action against the defendant, 
alleging that the defendant had failed to pay overtime to certain information 
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technology workers in its California facilities because the defendant had 
improperly classified members of the overtime class as exempt from state 
overtime laws.278  The plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of two 
classes:  an overtime class and a break class.279  The overtime class, as 
defined in the complaint, consisted of all of the defendant’s current and 
former California employees—specifically, those employed as Data Base 
Administrators, Senior Systems Administrators, Systems Engineers, and 
Information Analysts—who, within four years of filing the complaint until 
the date of judgment, performed work in excess of eight hours in one day 
and/or forty hours in one week and did not receive overtime.280 
The court found that the plaintiffs defined the overtime class differently 
in the motion for class certification than in the complaint.281  In the motion, 
the class was defined as all information technology workers employed in 
California who were entitled to, but were not paid, overtime.282  The court 
held that the class as defined in the motion was an “impermissible ‘fail-
safe’ class” whose members would be bound only by favorable 
judgment.283  The class definition in the motion created a fail-safe class 
because, if the court determined that the defendant’s information 
technology workers were not entitled to overtime, the information 
technology workers would not be class members.284  Consequently, if the 
information technology workers were class members, the workers could 
relitigate the claims against the defendant in a separate case.285 
Although the court found that the class definition in the motion was 
problematic, the court noted that it was not apparent that the plaintiffs 
intended to seek certification of a class of information technology workers 
entitled to overtime.286  Rather, the plaintiffs’ central claim was that all 
information technology workers employed by the defendant were entitled to 
overtime.287  Recognizing that the class definition in the motion was likely 
the result of imprecise drafting, the court chose to analyze whether the 
overtime class, as defined in the complaint, met the Rule 23(a) and (b) 
requirements for class certification.288  Finding those requirements met, the 
court certified the modified class.289 
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III.  FAIL-SAFE CLASSES ARE BARRED FROM CLASS CERTIFICATION 
Part III.A contends that courts must preclude fail-safe classes from 
certification because they circumvent the doctrine of res judicata by 
allowing class members to relitigate claims against the defendant and by 
reinstating one-way intervention.  Part III.B argues that the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits, which have not prohibited the certification of fail-safe classes, 
erroneously relied on prior Fifth Circuit case law that did not address 
whether a fail-safe class could be maintained.  Finally, Part III.C concludes 
that fail-safe classes independently preclude class certification because 
failing to satisfy the ascertainability requirement must be treated as an 
independent bar to class certification. 
A.  Fail-Safe Classes Violate Res Judicata 
This section maintains that fail-safe classes must be understood as a 
problem of res judicata.  First, it contends that fail-safe classes must be 
precluded from class certification because, in the case of an adverse 
judgment, fail-safe class members are defined out of the class and may 
relitigate their claims against the defendant.  It then argues that fail-safe 
classes reinstate the one-way intervention eradicated by the 1966 
amendment to Rule 23 by permitting class members to benefit from and be 
bound only by a favorable judgment. 
1.  Fail-Safe Class Members Are Not Claim Precluded 
Fail-safe classes must be proscribed because fail-safe classes create a res 
judicata problem where class members are not precluded from relitigating 
the same claims against the defendant.290  Because membership in a fail-
safe class is contingent on the validity of the class members’ claims against 
the defendant,291 class members held not to have valid claims against the 
defendant are defined out of the class.292  When the court enters judgment 
against the class as defined in the certification order,293 class members that 
have been defined out of the class are not subject to the judgment of the 
court.294  If class members defined out of the class are not subject to the 
court’s judgment, then those class members can relitigate their claims 
against the defendant in a subsequent action.295  Fail-safe classes thus 
violate res judicata by allowing class members to relitigate a claim that has 
been fully adjudicated against the defendant, such that a final judgment on 
the merits in favor of the defendant does not prevent the defendant from 
liability against future claimants.296 
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The Sixth Circuit recognized that fail-safe classes must be precluded 
from class certification for this reason.297  In Randleman, although the Sixth 
Circuit did not explicitly state that individuals defined out of a fail-safe 
class could relitigate claims against the defendant, the court held that fail-
safe classes shielded the class members from receiving an adverse 
judgment.298  More recently in Young, while the Sixth Circuit held that the 
proposed class was not fail-safe, the court recognized a proscription against 
fail-safe classes because such classes include only those entitled to relief,299 
such that a class member either won or was defined out of the class.300  
Moreover, the Young court explicitly recognized that allowing members of 
a fail-safe class to be defined out of the class in the case of an adverse 
judgment failed to provide the final resolution of the claims of all class 
members.301 
The Seventh Circuit has also proscribed fail-safe classes on the grounds 
that they allow individuals defined out of the class to relitigate their 
claims.302  In Dafforn, later relied on by the Seventh Circuit in 
Adashunas,303 the court held that the amended class definition created a 
fail-safe class because a finding that the defendants did not charge illegal 
fees would mean that no class existed and that the class members could 
relitigate the illegality of the defendant’s fees.304  The Seventh Circuit thus 
held that fail-safe classes were impermissible, as Rule 23 was not meant to 
be an exception to the rules of res judicata by allowing class members to 
relitigate claims upon receiving an adverse judgment.305 
2.  Fail-Safe Classes Reinstate One-Way Intervention 
The res judicata argument can be taken one step further.306  Fail-safe 
classes must be barred from class certification because allowing fail-safe 
classes to be certified reinstates the one-way intervention that the 1966 
amendment to Rule 23 was designed to abrogate.307  Under the 1966 
amendment, the court’s judgment—whether or not favorable to the class—
must include all individuals that the court finds to be class members.308  
Fail-safe classes thus violate the amendment by allowing class members to 
benefit from a favorable judgment but to be defined out of the class in the 
case of an adverse judgment.309  Fail-safe classes can be analogized to the 
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spurious class actions310 the amendment eliminated by removing the 
tripartite characterizations of class actions.311  Much like the spurious class 
action in which class members could intervene to receive the benefit of a 
favorable judgment but were not bound by an adverse judgment, fail-safe 
class members are only bound by a favorable judgment.312 
While the Sixth Circuit has recognized that fail-safe classes must be 
precluded from class certification because they are subject only to an 
adverse judgment,313 it has failed to acknowledge that fail-safe classes 
actually reinstate one-way intervention.314  In Randleman, it held that the 
class was fail-safe but failed to acknowledge that the reason it was 
impermissible for a class to be bound only by a favorable judgment was 
that, under the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, a class cannot intervene only to 
benefit from a favorable judgment.315  Similarly in Young, while the Sixth 
Circuit acknowledged that fail-safe classes were proscribed because class 
members could seek a remedy but not be bound by an adverse judgment, 
the court also failed to correlate fail-safe classes with one-way 
intervention.316 
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis suffers from the same shortcoming.317  In 
Messner, it noted that the problem posed by fail-safe classes was that a 
class member either won or, by virtue of losing, was defined out of the 
class; but it failed to take the argument one step further and assert that fail-
safe classes restore the historically proscribed one-way intervention.318 
B.  The Fifth and Ninth Circuits Incorrectly Analyzed the Fail-Safe Problem 
This section argues that the Fifth Circuit in Rodriguez recognized 
Forbush and Mullen as rejecting a bar against certifying fail-safe classes 
even though Forbush and Mullen never addressed whether a fail-safe class 
could be maintained or the justifications for denying class certification to a 
fail-safe class.  This section then contends that, while the Ninth Circuit in 
Vizcaino improperly relied on Fifth Circuit precedent in Forbush, Ninth 
Circuit and district court jurisprudence following Vizcaino has created 
ambiguity over whether the Ninth Circuit has rejected a prohibition against 
fail-safe classes. 
1.  The Fifth Circuit 
In Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit interpreted its precedent in Forbush and 
Mullen as rejecting a rule against certifying fail-safe classes, therefore 
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insinuating that the proposed classes in Forbush and Mullen were fail-
safe.319  However, in neither case did the Fifth Circuit assert that the 
proposed classes were fail-safe, and in both cases the court rejected the 
argument that the class was defined in a circular fashion.320  Because the 
Fifth Circuit failed to recognize that the proposed class was fail-safe in both 
Forbush and Mullen, it failed to address the underlying res judicata 
implication by certifying fail-safe classes.321  By relying on Forbush and 
Mullen to explicitly reject a prohibition against fail-safe classes, Rodriguez 
also failed to address the underlying res judicata concern of maintaining a 
fail-safe class.322 
In Forbush, the Fifth Circuit held that the class definition was not 
circular323 because the possibility that certain class members could fail to 
prevail on their individual claims would not defeat class membership when 
the class was linked by a common complaint.324  However, the problem 
with the proposed class was not that some class members might fail to 
prevail on their claims, but rather that the class included only individuals 
entitled to relief.325  Likewise, whether the class members were linked by a 
common complaint was an issue of commonality and should not have 
prevented the court from assessing whether the proposed class was 
ascertainable.326  If a proposed class is not ascertainable, then the fact that 
the class is linked by a common complaint does not allow the class to 
circumvent the ascertainability requirement.327 
The proposed class in Forbush was fail-safe because the class was 
defined such that membership in the class depended on the validity of the 
class members’ claims.328  If a court held that a class member’s employee 
benefits were not improperly reduced, the class member would be defined 
out of the class and would not be bound by an adverse judgment.329  By 
failing to recognize that the class in Forbush was fail-safe, the Fifth Circuit 
also failed to address the res judicata problems implicated by fail-safe class 
definitions330 and instead focused on whether a poorly drafted class 
definition required the district court to outright deny class certification.331  
If the Fifth Circuit in Forbush had found that the class was fail-safe, the 
court would have had to address whether a fail-safe class could be certified 
despite the fact that the class members would be bound only by a favorable 
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judgment and could relitigate claims against the defendant if the class 
members were defined out of the class.332 
While the Forbush court also rejected the argument that the class 
definition was circular because accepting that argument would preclude 
class certification from any class of persons alleging injury from a 
particular action,333 this point misconstrued the ascertainability 
requirement.334  Requiring that a class not be defined in terms of the 
validity of the class members’ claims does not preclude any class of persons 
from alleging injury from a particular action;335 rather, it ensures that there 
is a class capable of identification prior to final judgment.336 
In Mullen, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that in Forbush it had allowed 
the class to be certified even though the class was defined in terms of an 
ultimate issue in the case.337  Relying on Forbush, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the class could be certified even though the class definition in Mullen 
referenced the ultimate issue of causation.338  The court in Mullen, 
however, never identified the class in either Forbush or Mullen as fail-
safe.339  By allowing a class to be certified even though the class definition 
referenced the ultimate issue of causation, the Fifth Circuit in Mullen 
allowed a fail-safe class to be certified.340  After all, a fail-safe class is, by 
definition, a class that references the defendant’s liability, including the 
ultimate issue of causation.341  Yet, because the Fifth Circuit in Mullen 
failed to recognize that the class was fail-safe, it also failed to address the 
problems associated with allowing class members to be bound only by a 
favorable judgment and to be able to relitigate claims after being defined 
out of the class.342 
In Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit interpreted its prior decisions in Forbush 
and Mullen as rejecting a prohibition against fail-safe classes even though 
the prior decisions did not even recognize that the proposed classes were 
fail-safe.343  Relying on Forbush and Mullen as precedent, the Fifth Circuit 
in Rodriguez held that the bankruptcy court did not adopt an improper class 
definition despite the admittedly fail-safe nature of the class.344  In relying 
on Forbush and Mullen, Rodriguez explicitly rejected a prohibition against 
fail-safe classes based on prior cases that had neither professed to reject a 
prohibition against fail-safe classes nor addressed the implications of 
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adopting such a rejection.345  Furthermore, even when the Fifth Circuit in 
Rodriguez was explicitly rejecting the prohibition against fail-safe classes, 
it failed to recognize the res judicata implications of certifying the proposed 
fail-safe class.346  While the Fifth Circuit noted that a fail-safe class 
precludes the possibility of an adverse judgment against class members, the 
Fifth Circuit failed to recognize that allowing class members to be bound 
only by a favorable judgment violates res judicata because it not only 
allows class members to relitigate claims in the case of an adverse judgment 
but also reinstates one-way intervention.347 
2.  The Ninth Circuit in Vizcaino 
The Ninth Circuit applied Fifth Circuit case law to reject a challenge that 
the class definition was circular and failed to recognize that fail-safe classes 
circumvent the bar of res judicata.348  It remains unclear whether fail-safe 
classes are precluded in the Ninth Circuit, because subsequent case law has 
failed to recognize Vizcaino as expressly rejecting a prohibition against fail-
safe classes.349 
In Vizcaino, the court held that the originally certified class was not 
circular, citing the proposition from Forbush that success of a claim hinging 
on the resolution of a disputed legal issue did not make a class definition 
circular.350  The Ninth Circuit also compared the class in Vizcaino to the 
class in Forbush, finding that the class in the former was no more circular 
than that in the latter.351  Given that Rodriguez later interpreted Forbush as 
rejecting a rule against fail-safe classes, the class in Forbush was arguably 
fail-safe.352  If the class in Forbush was fail-safe, then the class definition 
was also circular in nature, as the courts have used the terms 
interchangeably to describe a class that is defined in terms of the validity of 
the plaintiff’s claims.353  Thus, using Forbush as a benchmark for lack of 
circularity is ineffective.354 
The originally certified class in Vizcaino was fail-safe and required 
redefinition because the class was defined in terms of the defendant’s 
ultimate liability.355  Under the originally proposed class definition, if the 
court held that the class member was not denied employee benefits because 
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the class member was considered an independent contractor or an employee 
of a third-party employment agency, then the individual would be defined 
out of the class and would not be bound by an adverse judgment.356  Yet, 
because the Ninth Circuit did not recognize that the proposed class was fail-
safe, the Ninth Circuit also failed to address the res judicata implications of 
allowing the originally certified class to proceed absent redefinition.357  
Had the Ninth Circuit recognized that the class was fail-safe, it would have 
had to confront whether fail-safe classes must be proscribed on those 
grounds.358 
C.  Fail-Safe Classes Independently Preclude Class Certification 
This section concludes that a fail-safe class, if unmodified, is an 
independent basis for denying class certification.  Moreover, it argues that 
courts must inquire whether the class definition creates a fail-safe class 
before addressing the Rules 23(a) and (b) requirements for class 
certification.  
While the Sixth Circuit in Randleman explicitly held that a fail-safe class 
is independent grounds for denying class certification,359 the Seventh 
Circuit has not yet decided whether a fail-safe class independently bars 
class certification.360  However, the Seventh Circuit in Messner suggested 
that a fail-safe class should not be treated as independent grounds for 
denying class certification, stating that courts should often resolve the fail-
safe problem by refining the class definition as opposed to denying class 
certification.361 
The Randleman approach—recognizing that fail-safe classes 
independently bar class certification—is the better conception of the 
problem with fail-safe classes.  The reason fail-safe classes are grounds for 
denying class certification is that fail-safe classes fail to satisfy the widely 
recognized ascertainability requirement for class certification.362  Simply 
put, fail-safe classes are not ascertainable because they are not capable of 
identification prior to final judgment, as a judgment on the defendant’s 
liability is necessary to determine class membership.363 
Until the circuits determine whether ascertainability is an independent 
basis to deny class certification,364 failing to satisfy the ascertainability 
requirement should also be treated as independent grounds for denying 
class certification analogous to the failure to satisfy one of the Rule 23(a) or 
(b) requirements for class certification.365  Not only is it “axiomatic” that a 
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class must be capable of identification prior to a final judgment on the 
merits,366 but failure to satisfy the ascertainability requirement prevents 
courts and parties from understanding the burdens of class certification,367 
creates problems of administrative feasibility368 at odds with the efficiency 
rationale for class actions,369 and hinders the ability of the court to identify 
those entitled to notice and the opportunity to opt out of the action.370  
Considering the strong reasons why ascertainability should be treated as an 
independent requirement for class certification, a fail-safe class that fails to 
satisfy the ascertainability requirement is an independent justification for 
denying class certification.371 
However, like the Seventh Circuit articulated in Messner, courts do have 
the discretion to modify the class definition to avoid denying class 
certification.372  Prior to addressing the Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements, 
courts must first analyze whether the class definition creates a fail-safe 
class.373  If the class definition creates a fail-safe class, it is within the 
court’s discretion to modify the class definition to avoid denying class 
certification on the basis of the ill-defined fail-safe class.374  If it is futile to 
redefine the class because the fail-safe class was a guise for a deficiency in 
satisfying the Rule 23(a) and (b) prerequisites,375 or if the court chooses not 
to exercise its discretion to redefine the class,376 then a court must deny 
class certification. 
CONCLUSION 
The ascertainability requirement must continue to play a decisive role in 
class certification decisions.  Courts must determine at the outset of the 
class certification proceedings whether the class definition creates a fail-
safe class.  If the class definition creates a fail-safe class because the class 
definition references the defendant’s liability, then certification should be 
rejected unless the court can somehow modify the class definition out of 
fail-safe status.   
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